Judith Lohner, Sandra Banjac, Irene Neverla
with Shorouk El Hariry

Mapping structural conditions of journalism in Egypt

June 2016
The Working Papers in the MeCoDEM series serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the MeCoDEM Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.

Media, Conflict and Democratisation (MeCoDEM)
ISSN 2057-4002
Mapping structural conditions of journalism in Egypt
Copyright for this issue: ©2016 Judith Lohner, Sandra Banjac, Irene Neverla with Shorouk El Hariry
WP Coordination: University of Hamburg/Irene Neverla
Editor: Katy Parry
Editorial assistance and English-language copy editing: Emma Tsoneva
University of Leeds, United Kingdom 2016

All MeCoDEM Working Papers are available online and free of charge at www.mecodem.eu

For further information please contact Barbara Thomass, barbara.thomass@rub.de

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 613370. Project Term: 1.2.2014 – 31.1.2017.

Affiliation of the authors:

Judith Lohner
University of Hamburg
judith.lohner@uni-hamburg.de

Irene Neverla
University of Hamburg
Irene.neverla@uni-hamburg.de

Sandra Banjac
University of Hamburg
sonv178@uni-hamburg.de
# Table of contents

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1  
Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 3  
Country report: Current structural conditions of journalism in Egypt.................. 7  
Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 19  
Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 21
Executive Summary

Using a multi-dimensional scheme as a conceptual framework, this working paper maps the structural conditions relevant to journalism and conflict communication in Egypt. The report makes use of a broad range of country-specific academic literature, as well as reports compiled by various non-academic organisations active in the media sector.

- 'Structural conditions' are understood as the totality of (formal and informal) orders and structures that characterise media and journalism in a certain space, usually a country.
- Eleven interrelated and interdependent dimensions of structural conditions relevant to media and journalism have been extracted and adapted from existing literature, guiding structured and comprehensive analysis within specific (country) contexts: (1) historical development, (2) political system, (3) political culture, (4) media freedom, (5) level of state control and regulation of media by the state, (6) media ownership and financing, (7) structure of media markets and patterns of information distribution, (8) orientation of media, (9) political/societal activity and parallelism of media, (10) journalism culture, and (11) journalistic professionalism.
- The analysis suggests that in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution there were short term trends towards media liberalisation in Egypt, though structural conditions of media and journalism today are characterised by an authoritarian and centralistic political system, a clientelist political culture, an oppressive legal and regulatory framework, significant state control and interference in all kinds of media, a climate of fear and the prosecution of journalists.
- Although Egypt has a great number of media outlets, private media ownership and funding is lacking in transparency, with many owners assumed to be tied to the old elites and the regime.
- Though after the revolution, the media became polarised, with marked differentiation between state and independent coverage, since July 2013, both state and private media have been perceived as sympathetic to the military government, and as demonising oppositional voices. In particular, journalists employed by the state media do not perceive their roles as independent from the political sphere, demonstrating a quite concordant culture, though most private
media journalists also understand they have a 'patriotic duty' that should guide their practices.

- Within this context, the journalistic profession is marked by limited professional training and limited self-regulation, poor job security and a weak consensus on ethical standards.
Introduction

This working paper aims to systematically and comprehensively map the structural conditions relevant to journalism and conflict communication in Egypt.

In specific situations such as democratisation conflicts and in certain countries, as well as in general terms journalistic performance and journalism culture are informed by various interrelated constituents: journalistic work practices, role perceptions, ethical orientations, and, last but not least, the structural conditions of journalism (Neverla et al. 2015).

Based on Kleinsteuber (2005, p.275), by structural conditions, we understand the totality of (formal and informal) orders and structures that characterise media and journalism in a certain space, most commonly, a country.

These structural conditions are established on four levels: (1) the respective society in general, (2) the media system, (3) the professional field of journalism and (4) the particular media organisation.

Several dimensions can be extracted and adapted from existing research on structural conditions of media and journalism, which is largely based in comparative studies on media systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012; Blum 2014). These dimensions are listed and described in the table below.\(^1\)

\(^1\) For a more in-depth description of dimensions please refer to Lohner et al. (2016).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical development: Political stability of country</td>
<td>Changes of political systems / regimes over time and impact on the media system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Political system / form of Government | - Formal and informal rules regarding:  
  - Freedom of people to vote  
  - Degrees of division of power (system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government)  
  - Institutionalisation of the rule of law and civil liberties |
| Political culture | - Concepts, ideas and structures ruling both the functioning of institutions (media) and agency of political and societal actors as well as citizens:  
  - Centrality of the state in aspects of society (low state intervention of liberal system vs. high involvement in welfare system)  
  - Distribution of political power (majoritarian vs. consensus politics)  
  - Relationship between political institutions and the public (individualised vs. organised pluralism)  
  - Level of cleavage of political parties and ideologies (polarised vs. moderate vs. fragmented vs. hegemonic pluralism)  
  - Adherence to formal rules, procedures and political institutions (rational-legal authority vs. clientelism)  
  - Political culture of citizens: How people see the role of the state, treat different ethnicities, religions, linguistic groups, participate in community / political life (voter turnout), The kind of political debates/historical traditions they support |
| Media freedom | - Level of media freedom in legal framework (constitution, media laws and regulation on censorship, information access and control, legal protection of journalistic actors, legal autonomy of regulation bodies)  
  - Policies and actions by state actors or legal bodies |
| State control / regulation of media | - Intention of state control (Political control through organisational, personnel and content-oriented intervention vs. apolitical regulation via distributing frequencies, limiting advertising)  
  - Media types that are being controlled/regulated, addressees of media control  
  - Procedures regarding licensing of media outlets, accreditation of journalists  
  - Character of regulation bodies (state or independent public institutions)  
  - Nature of prosecution of journalists by state actors |
| Media ownership and financing | • Whether media are owned by private companies and/or the public or state  
• Market driven media, mixed-source financing, and state financing |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Structure of media markets and patterns of information distribution | • Audience and market share of different media types  
• Size of media market / Level of internationalisation  
• (De-)centralisation of media market / system  
• Pluralism / concentration of ownership  
• Patterns of media distribution and circulation of information |
| Orientation of media | • Primary social focus that guides news production: commerce/market oriented, divergent, society oriented |
| Political / societal activity and parallelism of media | • Tendency of media to intervene in political debate / engage in advocacy / influence political events  
• Alignment between media outlets/individual journalists and political parties and societal actors (religious institutions, trade unions, business)  
• Polarisation of the public/audiences according to the political orientation of media which they consume |
| Journalism culture | • Overall status of journalism and role perception of journalists in relation to other social systems: investigative/critical, ambivalent, or rather concordant to those in power |
| Journalistic professionalism | • Internal rules and norms of the professional field and media institutions:  
  o Level of professional education/training  
  o Level of professional organisation  
  o System of self-regulation  
  o Awareness of professional norms and practices  
  o Prestige/competitiveness of journalistic profession |

It is important to keep in mind that, while structures are often referred to as something static or ‘given’, they are established by different actors and always subject to changes (Hallin and Mancini 2012b, pp.302–303). Obviously, this particularly applies to countries in transition. Thus, agency and the procedural dimension are also an important focus of analysis the structural dimensions of journalism are being investigated.

We will provide a systematic and critical analysis of the structural conditions of media and journalism in Egypt based on the scheme of dimensions. The report builds on country-specific literature that touches on subjects raised within each of the dimensions, aiming at a comprehensive overview of the structural conditions of media and journalism in the country.
Furthermore, using country-specific literature should enable us to identify possible additional factors of structural conditions specific to the Egyptian context.

Limitations in existing research and the availability of current facts and figures have resulted in varying amounts of information on certain dimensions. Due to the focus of existing literature, this paper will focus on the structural conditions concerning (1) the respective society in general, (2) the media system, and (3) the professional field of journalism. Structural conditions at level 4 (particular media organisation) will be treated in detail in the MeCoDEM interviews with journalists reporting on democratisation conflicts.

In addition, it should be noted that the editorial deadline for this working paper was April 2015 and therefore subsequent publications relating to structural conditions of journalism in Egypt are not reflected here.
Country report: Current structural conditions of journalism in Egypt

From its emancipation from colonisation and the formation of a presidential republic in 1952 until the 2011 revolution (or uprising), a military-led, authoritarian regime ruled Egypt under the presidencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Al Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). Sadat introduced a multi-party system in the years prior to his assassination, but multi-candidate presidential elections were not introduced until 2005, allegedly as part of a bid to institutionalise a succession mechanism for Mubarak’s son, Gamal (Blaydes 2006, p.3).

Each president shaped the media system differently: Nasser used the media as an instrument of political mobilisation to promote his radical ideology of socialism, anti-imperialism, and Pan Arabism while Sadat adopted a form of liberalisation, reinstating political parties and returning to them the right to publish newspapers. When Sadat was assassinated in 1981, a State of Emergency was imposed, restricting press freedoms (Mabrouk 2010, p.3) with laws allowing censorship and the right to close down newspapers in the name of national security (Amin n.d., p.4).

Hosni Mubarak’s 30 year rule witnessed few modifications to the restrictive legislation governing the media (Richter 2008). In practice however, there were significant changes. During the 2000s, the Mubarak regime tolerated significant reforms to the Egyptian media landscape including the introduction of private satellite television channels, the spread of privately owned opposition newspapers (both in print and online), and growing Internet accessibility (El Shaer, 2015, p.2). While the regime continued to exercise extensive control over media operations and used intimidation to silence opposition (El Masry 2012, pp.3-4), the political cost of prosecuting the media increased, helping to extend media freedom though without the necessary legal safeguards. This situation allowed the media, particularly the private media, to contribute to shaping public attitudes towards the regime, leading to the fall of Mubarak early in 2011.

In post-revolution Egypt, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) took power from February 2011, when Mubarak stepped down, until the beginning of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Muhammad Morsi’s term as president in June 2012. The Brotherhood led the government for a year until the military removed Morsi from power in July 2013 (El-Sherif 2014, pp.3-4). After the election of General Abdul Fattah El Sisi in June 2014, Egypt was effectively placed under military rule (El-Sherif 2014, p.26). Egypt’s political history can be summarised as experiencing relatively high political stability over several decades, marked by authoritarian and centralistic rule (Blum 2014, p.103). As further elaborated below, the country has also witnessed political continuity since the revolution despite rule by different regimes over a short period of time since 2011.

We thank our colleagues Gamal Soltan and Yosra El Gendi for their valuable contribution to this report.

---

2 We thank our colleagues Gamal Soltan and Yosra El Gendi for their valuable contribution to this report.
As for the **political system**, before the uprising, Egypt was an electoral authoritarian country (Blaydes 2006, p.1). Despite high hopes for democratic reform in 2011, the uprising led to deep political and ideological polarisation between Islamists and secularists, allowing the re-emergence of military power that returned Egypt to authoritarianism, and underlining the failure of democratic alternatives to capitalise on opportunities presented by the uprising (El-Sherif 2014, p.5). The only truly open and free presidential **elections** took place in 2012, when Morsi narrowly defeated the Mubarak regime’s candidate, Ahmad Shafik. In 2014, General el-Sisi won 93 per cent of the votes, with a turnout of 47 per cent, lower than the 52 per cent turnout in the 2012 presidential election runoff. This may be attributable to the ban imposed on the Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party (Blum 2014, p.105).

The executive (in Egypt’s case, the president) traditionally monopolises power; parliament, controlled by the governing party, plays a relatively insignificant role. The judiciary is prone to interference by the executive. Morsi, who as Blum points out, is considered an “authoritarian revolutionary leader in the service of Muslim Brotherhood” maintained this **division of power** after his election as president in autumn 2012 (Blum 2014, p.105).

In many ways, Egypt has returned to its position pre-2011; the “old state” persists and the authoritarian, clientelist and elitist politics of the Mubarak era have been reproduced (El Sherif 2014, p.4, Blum 2014, p.104). The military has significant control over the economy and holds power in every national political arena (Dunne 2014, p.1). As Ahdaf Soueif (2014) writes in The Guardian, “the country (has) gone back into autocratic mode”. El Sisi is an elected and, so far, popular president and according to Soueif (2014) the usual bargain has been struck: “we’ll give up on our freedoms in return for security”. Meanwhile, the process of creating a new political system and an effective state has been plagued by power struggles between state institutions, a lack of a political class, and the state’s inability to deliver solutions to the socio-economic crisis (El-Sherif 2014, p.5).

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), indicators of **political culture** and the **cleavage between political parties and ideologies** point to Egypt’s place in the “polarized pluralist category”. Following the revolution, the political spectrum has broadened and there are distinct and sharply defined differences in ideologies between the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, secular movements and groups supporting the old, military regime (Powers 2012, p.72). Morsi’s deposition from power exacerbated political polarisation in the country and deepened the divide between pro- and anti-Morsi camps. Opposition forces (both Muslim Brotherhood and non-Islamist critics) were marginalised by the military in the following months (Freedom House 2014a, Freedom House 2015). In December 2013, the Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organisation, allowing the authorities to charge anyone participating in a pro-Morsi demonstration with terrorism and laying the foundation for the Islamist opposition’s
total political isolation. The new constitution banned parties founded on religion (Freedom House 2015).

However, even today, competition both within and between national institutions such as the military, police, judiciary, religious institutions and civil society demonstrates a lack of consensus regarding the country’s direction (El-Sherif 2014, p.25).

Current literature indicates that the political corporatism of the old regime is likely to re-emerge (El-Sherif 2014, p.6; p.26). The state is central to all aspects of Egyptian society and any attempts to break genres and modes of representation established by the state are “deemed illegitimate by an elitist, centralized and securitized approach to culture” (Aly 2014, p.103). The military is deemed autonomous and unaccountable (El-Sherif 2014, p.25) and in practice, the spirit of law is not respected by authorities, particularly within bureaucratic institutions (Teti and Gervasio 2012, p.107). This clientelist system reflects the relationship between voters and candidates in elections; while some voters cast their ballots based on ideological beliefs, many expect to receive direct benefits in the form of goods or services in exchange for their vote. In such cases voters, who tend to be members of lower classes, are clients of a regime of patronage (Blaydes 2006, p.2).

This regime is connected to the citizens’ political culture. Al-shakhshiyya al-misriyya, (Arabic: the Egyptian character) constructed by the mass media industry, is seen as an instrument of power and governance. According to Aly (2014, p.104), Egyptian media spoon-feeds citizens an image of the ‘real’ Egyptian through pedagogic modes of production: a stereotype formed by fixed nodes of belonging, gender, class, religion and social stratification. These images, mainly broadcast on state-owned television, are created through simplistic scripts, where “large swathes of Egyptian society either remain invisible or are misrepresented within the national public sphere” (ibid., p.105). Even after the revolution, state media continued to reflect the PR needs of the SCAF and subsequent governments, leaving the role of public information campaigns around civic participation and responsibility to private satellite channels and social media (ibid., p.105). While many scholars focused on the role of social media in fuelling the uprising, little attention has been paid to traditional, face-to-face communication outlets, such as Friday mosque sermons and coffee shop gatherings, which are considered to play an important role in developing the Arabic public sphere (Dajani 2014, p.207).

Government control also manifests in civil society. Egypt is often described as having one of the most vibrant civil society sectors in the developing world, with around 40,000 locally registered NGOs (Mikhail 2014, p.1). However, these groups have struggled with laws overseeing non-governmental organisations, a conflict which has intensified in the wake of the ‘foreign funding’ debate. Minister of International Cooperation Faiza Aboulnaga accused NGOs of receiving unauthorised foreign
funding and operating without licenses, an accusation that was labelled duplicitous given that Aboulnaga was responsible for overseeing NGO activities under Mubarak’s rule, and that the largest recipient of ‘foreign funding’ is the state itself, with nearly USD 1bn going to the military (Teti and Gervasio 2012, p.107). The NGO ‘foreign funding’ case has “wreaked havoc on democracy promotion efforts in Egypt”, and was described as a “tactical maneuver in the grand scheme of Egyptian politics” (Dunne 2014). As a result, prominent foundations such as Freedom House have been banned. The organisation was forced to cancel its grants to several Egyptian NGOs, and four of its employees fled the country in fear of jail sentences (ibid. 2014).

Media freedom is heavily controlled by a severely complex web of legislation such as the constitutional framework, Press Law, Penal Code and Intelligence Law, which prevent journalists from operating freely and limits their room for manoeuvre (El Issawi 2014, p.8; Mabrouk 2010, p.3). Egypt currently ranks 159th of 180 in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, due to the “deliberate chilling of media freedom and free speech through arrests and criminalization of legitimate journalism” (Reporters Without Borders 2014) and according to Alison McKenzie, Executive Director of International Press Institute, the continual scapegoating of journalists and their news organisations (International Press Institute 2013). Egypt’s status in the Freedom House Freedom of the Press ranking declined from ‘Partly Free’ in 2011 to ‘Not Free’ in 2012 and 2013 due to officially tolerated intimidation of journalists, increased efforts to prosecute reporters and commentators for insulting the political leadership, violent crackdowns on Islamist political groups and civil society, and state surveillance of electronic communications (Freedom House 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015).

According to the constitutional framework, freedom of expression and the press is guaranteed and censorship forbidden by the provisional constitution adopted by SCAF in 2011, the constitution adopted under Morsi’s presidency and the current constitution approved by referendum in 2014 (Freedom House 2012, 2013, 2014a). However, this freedom can only be exercised ‘within the law’ and there is no further clarification of its limitations. Despite the political and constitutional changes since 2011, the Mubarak-era press laws and Penal Code have remained in place and include an array of articles that allow journalists to be prosecuted for their reporting (Freedom House 2014a). As El Issawi reports there are around 35 articles in various laws that prescribe penalties for the media, ranging from fines to prison sentences, which are imposed for offences such as “insulting the president”, “insulting religions”, or “the publication of material that constitutes an attack against the dignity and honor of individuals” (El Issawi 2014, pp.21-23).

While the current constitution bans censorship of media outlets and repressive sanctions against journalists, this protection does not apply in times of war or when a state of emergency has been declared (Freedom House 2014a, El Issawi 2014, pp.24-26). To avoid legal confrontation with the government, it is reported that journalists
resort to self-censorship, drawing lines around areas deemed too sensitive to tackle (Mabrouk 2010, p.4; Abdulla 2014, p.4), and thus avoiding direct government intervention. El Issawi suggests that another common way to impose self-censorship in newsrooms is by offering journalists the potential to earn additional income by appointing them to higher positions in government bodies or within media outlets owned by wealthy businessmen compliant with the regime (El Issawi 2014, p.33). However, in some situations direct state intervention has been visible: after the ousting of Morsi, several famous journalists’ articles that were critical of the situation were banned from publication in their respective media outlets (Abdulla 2014, p.25). Another example of direct censorship is “Al-Bernameg” (Arabic: The Programme), a popular show presented by political satirist Bassem Youssef on the CBC channel, which was taken off air for ‘violating the editorial policy of the channel’ after mocking the post-Morsi regime and referring to the ousting as a ‘coup’ (Abdulla 2014, p.25).

There is no right to information or access to information law in Egypt. Article 8 of the Press Law states that journalists have the right to access information from public and government sources, but it also stipulates that this is subject to ‘applicable laws’ with no clarification as to what these may be (Mendel 2011, p.20). As only 6,000 of around 15,000 of the journalists working in Egypt are members of the Egyptian Journalist Syndicate (EJS), the profession’s official governing body, and EJS membership is the sole source of professional accreditation, the situation leaves thousands of media professionals without an official press card or access to professional sources (Berger 2014, pp.244-245).

In practice, the protection of journalists is weak. Article 7 of the Press Law protects the right of journalists not to reveal their confidential sources, and prohibits the coercion of journalists to reveal those sources. However, “these protections are subject to relevant laws”, meaning that any law may override the right to protect confidential sources. The Press Code of Ethics (1988) restricts journalists from causing harm and seeks to establish their right to protect their sources and not be subjected to blackmail; however, it is not clear how the Code is applied; it is only binding for journalists while the usual expectation would be adherence by other actors such as the police or security forces (Mendel 2011, p.19).

Consequently, the opaque media framework in Egypt has been used to intimidate journalists, bloggers and broadcasters (Abdulla 2014, p.4). The military-backed government’s rule is witnessing “an unprecedented campaign of media repression with frequent intimidation and journalists’ arrests described by media watchdogs” (El Issawi 2014, p.8, Freedom House 2015).

Private TV stations are subjected to pressure when their programming content is deemed to be ‘causing trouble’ (El Issawi 2014, p.23); for example, within hours of Morsi’s ousting, the army shut down Islamist TV channels Misr 25, Al Nas and Al Hafez (Abdulla, 2014, p.21). According to Reporters without Borders, five journalists were
killed and at least 80 detained by police in the second half of 2013 (Reporters without Borders 2014). A large number of these journalists are not accredited by EJS, which causes some confusion concerning their professional identity.

Although the government has never censored blogs, bloggers are subjected to offline harassment and several have been detained or questioned by security agents (Abdulla 2014, p.8). The Arab Network for Human Rights and Information reported that 24 cases were filed against journalists in the first 200 days of Morsi’s rule, with charges relating to defamation of the president, the judiciary or Islam, and broadcasting content inciting hatred (ibid., p.17). Private TV channel Al Faraeen was shut down, and its owner, Tawfik Okasha, faced over 30 court cases accused of defaming Morsi and inciting others to kill him. Journalist Al Husseiny Abou Deif, who was critical of Morsi and the Brotherhood, was shot dead with rubber bullets outside the Presidential Palace during a protest (ibid., p.18).

After Morsi was ousted by the military in July 2013, the government launched a systematic crackdown on Islamist media, shutting down television and print outlets and targeting and arresting both local and foreign journalists attempting to cover pro-Morsi protests. Five journalists were killed at the hands of the security forces in July and August of that year, for example in August, Sky News cameraman Mick Deane was shot and killed during a bloody crackdown on pro-Morsi sit-ins. In July, the BBC’s Jeremy Bowen was injured by birdshot pellets fired by security forces during a pro-Morsi protest (Freedom House 2014a).

In August 2013, several journalists, among whom were freelance photographer Mahmoud Abu-Zeid (professionally known as Shawkan) and Al-Jazeera journalist Abdullah Al-Sham, were arrested while covering violent clashes between supporters of ousted President Morsi and security forces. While Al-Shami was released on medical grounds in June 2014 following a 130 day hunger strike in protest over this detention, Shawkan’s incarceration has been extended repeatedly (Amnesty International 2015). Since December 2013, three Al-Jazeera journalists (Peter Greste, Mohammad Fahmy and Baher Mohammad) have been jailed following allegations of conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood to destabilise the country and reporting false news, belonging to a terrorist organisation and working without a permit. In June 2014, Baher Mohamed was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, a ruling that was labelled “a clear message to journalists: adhere to official narratives or risk severe punishment” by Index on Censorship (Index on Censorship 2014). Despite the international outcry over the sentencing of the three Al-Jazeera journalists, the then newly elected president Al Sisi initially said he would not interfere in the judicial ruling (Reuters 2014). However, Al Sisi ultimately criticised the detention of Al-Jazeera journalists, not because of concerns about freedom of expression but as a result of pressure from the journalists’ respective countries and the embarrassment their detention caused. He issued a presidential decree allowing deportation of convicted prisoners who are citizens of other nations. Greste was therefore released and deported to Australia and
Egyptian-Canadian Fahmy renounced his Egyptian citizenship and was deported to Canada in February 2015. After Baher Mohamed’s conviction was overturned on appeal in January 2015, he was released in February of that year (International Federation of Journalists 2015, Freedom House 2014a, Kirkpatrick 2015).\(^3\)

With regards to **media regulation and level of state control**, Abdulla summarises that media narratives have been controlled by successive regimes through a state media apparatus that supports whichever regime is in power, and private media outlets whose owners are linked to that regime (Abdulla 2014, p.1).

Generally, the media apparatus, especially state media, is still firmly linked to the political regime (El Issawi 2014, p.29), resulting in continuous **state interference** that serves as a tight constraint on Egyptian journalism (Rayman 2014, p.110, Blum 2014, p.106). Historically the Minister of Information oversaw the management and appointments of senior officials to the government controlled public broadcaster **Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU)** (El Issawi 2014, p.16, Freedom House 2013). However, even after the position of the Minister of Information was abolished with the passing of the 2014 constitution, the state continues to wield power over public broadcasting and television through the appointment of managerial staff. There are some 18 managers and senior personnel with military backgrounds in **ERTU**, all of whom have been appointed by direct presidential orders (El Shaer 2015, p.4). Not only does the state hold a monopoly on terrestrial broadcasting through **ERTU** (Mendel 2011, p.7), but the channel is also prohibited by its own Code of Ethics, to broadcast any material critical of the state or the national system (El Shaer 2015, p.4). Under Morsi’s presidency, the government—through the Ministry of Information, **ERTU**, and the Shura Council, Egypt’s upper house of parliament—were authorised to oversee licensing and determine what is appropriate for broadcast. Under the ‘Morsi’ constitution, the government and the judiciary were entitled to withdraw the licences of stations that violated a wide range of social, cultural, religious, and political sanctities (Freedom House 2014a, Abdulla 2014).

**Print media** are also controlled by the state, which owns the most important national newspapers **Al-Ahram**, **Al-Akhbar** and **Al-Gomhuria**. While there is a long tradition of politically appointing the administrative and editorial leadership, Morsi handed control of editorial and executive appointments to state publications to the Shura Council. Responsibility has now been passed to the Supreme Press Council established by the interim government in 2013 (Blum 2014, p.106, Freedom House 2014a). All private media outlets need a licence from the Press Council, whose

---

\(^3\) But the important geopolitical issue here is that this incident was part of the political rivalry between Egypt and the government of Qatar who owns Al-Jazeera and influences its editorial policy. This is a very important case for the role of state owned pan Arab media on the media landscape and politics in the Arab World.
members were initially appointed by the Shura Council until it was abolished in Egypt’s 2014 constitution and subsequently by the Prime Minister.

Recently state control has extended to internet communications despite online media traditionally enjoying greater freedom than its offline counterparts (although the Mubarak regime did briefly shutdown the country’s internet and mobile phone network during the 2011 protests). On June 1st, 2014, El Watan newspaper published a leaked proposal by the Ministry of Interior that recommended monitoring online social networks such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, as well as private messaging applications like WhatsApp and Viber. The Minister of Interior responded through state-owned Al Ahram, claiming that the monitoring software was “no threat to liberty” (Al-Ahram 2014).

As to the media landscape, in numbers, Egypt enjoys a great diversity of media outlets with more than 500 newspapers, magazines, journals, and other periodicals. While during Mubarak’s rule, the vast majority of outlets were in state hands, including all newspaper distribution networks, there have been significant changes in the media sector since the 2011 uprising as new outlets have proliferated (Freedom House 2014a). Today, the national state-owned dailies such as Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Gomhuria still dominate circulation, while party press only achieves only a small circulation. Among independent press, Al-Masy-al-Youm, Al-Watan, and Al-Shorouk belong to the most successful (Blum 2014, p.106). Under Mubarak, all terrestrial television broadcasters—two national and six regional—were owned and operated by the government through ERTU. However, there were four privately owned, independent satellite channels and several pan-Arab stations that attracted wide viewership. At least 25 new privately owned channels have emerged in the post-Mubarak era. (Freedom House 2014a)

In terms of ownership, Egyptian media are currently a blend of state-owned and private newspapers and broadcast stations (Mendel 2011, p.3). Television channel ownership was monopolised by the state until the rise of satellite broadcasting in 2001. The emergence of private satellite television channels was celebrated as the “emancipation of the media from state control” (Atallah and Rizk 2011, p.7). There was an initiative to open up the ownership scheme of the media sector to the Egyptian people through a shareholding system managed by independent bodies (El Issawi 2014, p.31), prohibiting individuals from owning a stake of more than 10 per cent in any outlet. However, the lack of transparency of media ownership makes monitoring this impossible (Abdulla 2013, p.9). Attallah and Rizk (2011, p.8) argued that in the aftermath of the revolution the old regime continued to hold Egypt’s wealth as well as controlling large shares of the media market. Webb suggests that the assumed limited range of ownership was insufficient to produce diversification of political views and information (Webb 2014, p.15).
As with ownership, funding sources are not truly transparent (El Issawi 2014, p.60). With the mainstream media acting as “pseudo-empires”, fundamentally influencing public opinion, “the amount of money involved in operating a media business is also deemed to be a barrier to diversity” (Attallah and Rizk 2011, p.8). In a market driven by advertising, competition between the private sector and the state media resulted in poor programming unable to stir the appetites of advertising agents on state television (El Issawi 2014, p.46), leaving the sector indebted to the government by around EGP 13.5 billion (ibid., p.30). The government supports state media both directly and through advertising subsidies, although the nature of these is unclear. It also has the potential to influence advertisers leaving independent media at risk of financial pressure, as was the case for media critical of the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood in late 2012 (Freedom House 2013).

In terms of the structure of media markets regarding use and reach of the different types of media, in a traditionally oral society with a literacy rate of 71 percent (out of 82.06 million inhabitants), satellite television has much better penetration than newspapers (Mabrouk 2010, p.v; Abdulla 2014, p.4). Broadcast remains the most powerful medium in terms of reach: almost all households own a television set (94 per cent in 2010) while the percentage of radio set ownership has declined (Abdulla 2013, p.15). Satellite reception grew from 32.5 per cent in 2005 to almost 60 per cent in 2009 (ibid., p.16). Recently, newspaper circulation has decreased dramatically after a sudden circulation surge that accompanied the revolutionary developments of 2011; 33 per cent of Egyptians, mostly members of the younger generation, read the news online (ibid., pp.19-20). According to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology’s ICT indicators report, the number of Internet users amounted to 47.52 million in November 2014, with an annual growth rate of 24.26 per cent; the most frequently visited website being Facebook (some 13.83 million users). This growth is constrained by high rates of illiteracy and inequalities in income, gender and demographics (Abdulla 2013, p.6; p.22).

International media played a crucial role in the uprisings, particularly Al-Jazeera, which offered an alternative to state media. The channel provided news unfiltered by the Ministry of Information, and offered live, continuous coverage of the protests in Tahrir (Peterson 2014, p.89). However, Al-Jazeera’s reputation for professional news reporting among its Egyptian viewers has suffered since it was accused of allying itself with the Brotherhood, making factual errors and giving false representations of the situation (Abdulla 2014, p.23). Cairo-based Al-Jazeera affiliate, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Misr, was shut down by a judicial ruling when it was accused of operating illegally and threatening national security. Its offices were raided and some staff were detained (El Issawi 2014, p.61). The detention of the three Al-Jazeera journalists mentioned previously was viewed as part of the political rivalry between Egypt and the government of Qatar which owns Al-Jazeera and influences its editorial policy (Kirkpatrick 2015). This case might be seen as an example of the strong role of state owned pan Arab media on the media landscape and politics in the Arab World.
In terms of **media orientation**, Egyptian private media are profit and advertising-driven within a market-oriented economy (Aly 2014, p. 107; Amin n.d., p.3). There is no obligation for private, commercially-funded media to disseminate public service content, and no incentives for them to do so (Abdulla 2013, pp.31-32). State-owned *ERTU*, is paralysed by institutional problems that resulted in it missing the opportunity to act as public media rather than state media (Abdulla 2014, p.27). While it “has been trying to act as a commercial broadcaster”, by aiming to “provide content to attract advertisers” (*ibid.*, pp.29-30), *ERTU* clearly represents the government and portrays messages supporting the regime. The Egyptian state media, therefore, has been described as a mobilisation press; the purpose of state media personnel is to rally the audience to nationalist cause and defend the country’s leadership and current power structure (Chammah 2014, p.279).

In terms of **political activity and parallelism**, Egyptian media have always been deeply involved in political discourse. The introduction of satellite television and the emergence of opposition papers during Mubarak’s era increased media pluralism. The media were thought to be acting as safety valves that allowed the public, unable to exercise its political rights, the chance to vent frustration at socio-political problems (Khamis 2011, p.1162). Partisan papers offered a quasi-alternative voice, though they were controlled by the state and their coverage was “largely dictated by the interests of their respective affiliated parties” (Attallah and Rizk 2011, p.6). Following the revolution, the “rampant politicking” (*El Issawi* 2014, p.30) of media production was explained: “there was no real political life, and media was replacing the lacking political parties, so it was overwhelmed by politics” (*ibid.*, p.30). Rather than becoming pluralised, the media was polarised, and there was a large gap between state and independent coverage (Chammah 2014, p.282).

During Morsi’s rule, the polarisation between Islamist channels and ‘secular’ private media outlets increased. This polarisation intensified for a period after the ousting of Morsi, though currently most media is supportive of the military. State television and most private channels ran banners with the Egyptian flag that stated “Egypt fights terrorism” in reference to the conflict with the Brotherhood (Abdulla 2014, p.23). Although it is also polarised, social media provided a platform for pursuit of the middle ground where activists could voice their opinions (Abdulla 2014, p.1). Following the ousting of Morsi, it became increasingly difficult to publish voices that are not pro-regime. The military started considering and approaching private media as a distribution channel for their own information as their trust in state press decreased when state media editors sided with the Muslim Brotherhood during Morsi’s rule (*El Issawi* 2014, p.49; Abdulla 2014, p.25). As Freedom House states in its report, at the end of the 2013, “most news outlets were sympathetic to the military government and failed to provide objective reporting or diverse viewpoints on the crisis” (Freedom House 2014a). In this context, both state and private media were accused of embracing
propagandist tabloid-style narratives and demonising oppositional voices (El Issawi 2014, p.48).

Political activity and partisanship are directly linked to journalism culture. As a result of the changing political landscape in post revolution Egypt, a state of confusion as to how to define journalistic roles in both private and state media has arisen (El Issawi 2014, p.70). However, there is a common understanding that ideals of impartiality are incompatible with the nature of the Egyptian audience (ibid., p.77). Existing literature suggests that state media journalists in particular do not perceive their role as independent of the political sphere, showing a quite concordant culture (Powers 2012, p.76, El Issawi 2014, p.12, Webb 2014, p.72). Similarly, most private media journalists feel a ‘patriotic duty’ guiding their practices, which suggests to some extent, allegiance to the regime (El Issawi 2014, p.77; Chammah 2014, Blum 2014). A community of independent journalists advocates on behalf of narratives favoured by activists (Chammah 2014, pp.277-288). The development of activism in the name of the revolution, however, has also been seen as hindering the development of independent, critical reporting, and aggravating the political instrumentalisation of the media (El Issawi 2014, p.12).

As to media professionalism, professional education and training are considered to be important structural indicators. In the immediate pre-revolutionary period, in 2010, Saleh referred to journalistic education in Egypt as “politically hazed and socially confused” (2010, p.132). He also stated that not a single media entity was satisfied with the quality of journalism education in Egyptian universities (ibid., p.116). This deterioration in journalism education has been linked to nepotism, and lack of career guidance and media ethics (ibid., p.126). While students attend ethics courses, they understand they will work with people who do not necessarily apply these standards (Webb 2014, p.87). Furthermore, most journalism departments do not adapt the Western curricula they import leading to a lack of balance between theory and practice (Saleh 2010, p.126).

Given the massive state interference in the media sector, self-regulation of the profession is undeveloped in Egypt. The press syndicate – the journalists’ union – faces interference by the state as a statutory body and is dominated by the state-owned press, despite an increasing diversity of private and alternative media (Berger 2014, p.245). When the revolution broke out, the EJS released no calls for the protection of journalists in the field, and failed to provide legal or professional support for journalists (ibid., p.238). Members may be removed from the Syndicate on various grounds, including disciplinary sanctions (Mendel 2011, p.16) – however, the fact that these sanctions have not been imposed in the last four decades could be indicative of solidarity among journalists against major violation of journalists’ rights, though there is very little agreement regarding less serious violations. The Press Code of Ethics does not function as a public complaints system; “instead, it is more of an administrative rule” (Mendel 2011, p.19).
Another factor impacting professionalism and journalistic standards is *professional security*. In 2010, print journalists’ salaries were as low as USD 90 per month (Saleh 2010, p.131). Members of the EJS receive stipends and monthly allowances paid by the government – a practice that has been identified as an indirect way of buying off journalists, as the stipends of between USD 140 and USD190 a month (Al Arab 2015), exceed the salaries many journalists receive from their employers. Presumably the financial burden caused by receipt of stipend is among the reasons for denying membership in EJS to many practicing journalists. The poor salaries of journalists are a further reflection of the financial burdens facing Egyptian media institutions, and lead to claims of corruption and illicit gains through business and government buy-offs. As Berger reports, some members of the syndicate are accused of being corrupt, taking “bonuses” that sometimes equal their salaries (Berger 2014, p.247). These accusations go largely unchecked because ethical violations and corruption in the press are never discussed in the EJS (*ibid.*, p.247).
Conclusions

In summary, the analysis suggests that although there was a temporary shift towards media liberalisation in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, structural conditions of the media and journalism today continue to be characterised by an authoritarian and centralistic political system, a clientelist political culture, an oppressive legal and regulatory framework, massive state control and interference in all kinds of media, a climate of fear and the real threat of prosecution of journalists.

While Egypt enjoys a great number of media outlets, private media ownership and funding is not transparent and many owners are thought to be linked to old elites and the regime.

Though, after the revolution, the media polarised, with significant differences between state and independent coverage, since July 2013, both state and private media have been perceived as sympathetic to the military government and instrumental in demonising oppositional voices. State media journalists in particular do not perceive their roles as independent from the political sphere and most private media journalists also feel a ‘patriotic duty’ guiding their practices.

Within this context, the journalistic profession is marked by limited professional training and self-regulation and social insecurity, as well as weak consensus on ethical standards amongst journalists.

In general, the list of dimensions has proven its validity, as it guides the analysis towards the central factors of structural conditions relevant to media and journalism in Egypt. However, the relative influence of each dimension inevitably varies. In addition, the implications of the internet and social media on the structural conditions of journalism have been considered systematically in (theoretical) literature on media systems.

Central structural factors of the political, economic and legal framework in Egypt exist on the level of the nation-state proving the validity of the country-specific analysis of structural conditions. However, the report also identified transnational influences, such as the importance of pan Arabic media in Egypt. Although the nation-state still seems to be the central unit of analysis at the beginning of 21st century, transnational impact should be an additional frame of investigation.

The report goes on to demonstrate the importance of conflict communication as a case study with regard to structural conditions: conflicts (and communication about them) can be considered a test case for the functioning of media-related structures, and serve as possible catalysts for changes to these structures.
This country report also confirms the need to consider agency and the procedural dimension while investigating structural conditions of media and journalism: structural conditions have been (re-) designed by central political incumbents, economic actors and media practitioners for their own benefit, changing repeatedly during the different phases of transition.

Although the literature allowed for a comprehensive country report, various knowledge gaps exist with regard to the different dimensions of structural conditions in Egypt. This applies, for instance, to ownership structures and media funding which lack transparency. Moreover, difficulties in getting reliable and up-to-date information arise from rapidly changing circumstances: as a result of the speed of developments, there is a lack of current, in depth academic research and in part the country report had to build on material produced by non-academic organisations. Hence, the report only allows for a snap-shot of structural conditions relevant to media and journalism in Egypt.

In conclusion, the report provides a useful basis for an informed analysis of MeCoDEM interviews with journalists relating to the structural conditions shaping media and journalism in Egypt. While the list of dimensions (table 1) offers insight into the general factors with the potential to shape journalism and media on a structural level, and how they interrelate with each other, the country report provides a comprehensive overview of the current structural conditions of media and journalism in Egypt— the interviewees’ statements on their working practices, role perceptions and ethical orientations. Overall performance in the various democratisation conflicts can be analysed and better explained against this background. As the paper includes an analysis of political systems, socioeconomic frameworks and political cultures of politicians and citizens in Egypt, it provides a useful background for MeCoDEM research on conflict communication by civil society actors and political activists (work package 5) as well as for the analysis of conflict management by governmental actors (work package 6).

MeCoDEM interviews with journalists in Egypt will provide additional empirical-based knowledge on cases and types of journalism embedded in certain structural conditions, i.e. how journalists function within these structures. This research will not only allow us to broaden knowledge on certain dimensions of structural conditions already mentioned in this working paper, but will likely elicit new structural factors of media and journalism which have not been considered in literature to date. On this basis, MeCoDEM findings will constitute a first step to reconsider and potentially expand the existing work on media systems and structural conditions of journalism in Egypt.
Bibliography


El Issawi, Fatima (2014): Egyptian Media Under Transition. In the Name of the Regime… In the Name of the People? Edited by Charlie Beckett. London School of Economics, POLIS. London (Arab Revolutions: Media Revolutions)


